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UPSTREAM WITHOUT A PADDLE: GENE PATENTING AND THE
PROTECTION OF THE "INFOSTRUCTURE"
SETH SHULMAN*
The U.S. patent system, designed to protect rights to specific, marketable
gadgets, has increasingly over the past few decades granted patents on
comparatively abstract and amorphous ideas and codes that stretch the
system beyond recognition. The calamitous results undermine the sys-
tem, hamper innovation, and are proving nearly impossible to adjudicate.
1.
Many worthy objections have been raised about the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office's decision, roughly a decade ago, to begin granting pa-
tents on human genes and tissues. Most critics of such patents argue that
the special attributes of human genes and tissues ought to exempt them
from consideration by the patent office. For instance, some have held that
human genes and tissues should not be considered patentable material be-
cause they are products of nature.1 Others have opposed human gene and
tissue patenting on moral grounds, arguing that humans are debased by
private ownership claims, including those over their constituent biological
parts. 2 Despite the salience of these arguments, I take issue with the patent-
ing of human genes and tissues not as special cases but rather as examples
of a broader, pervasive misunderstanding at today's U.S. Patent Office, a
flawed conception that poses a threat to the philosophical underpinnings of
the patent system itself. The problem has already triggered profound prob-
lems not only in the biomedical field but in many other high-tech areas as
well. At root, this flawed conception stems from the U.S. patent office's
anachronistic adherence to what we might call "the toaster model of inven-
tion."
* Seth Shulman is a journalist and author who has written widely about intellectual property,
including the 1999 book OWNING THE FUTURE. He is the author, more recently, of UNDERMINING
SCIENCE: SUPPRESSION AND DISTORTION IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2006), and THE TELEPHONE
GAMBIT: CHASING ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL'S SECRET (2008).
1. See Mark Sagoff, Intellectual Property and Products of Nature, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Summer
2002, at 12, 13.
2. For a discussion, see, for example, Annabelle Lever, Ethics and the Patenting of Human




Several years ago, after I published a book about patenting in today's
"knowledge-based" economy, 3 I had the opportunity on National Public
Radio to debate Q. Todd Dickinson, then commissioner of the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office.4 Dickinson noted that the U.S. patent system had
given us a host of time-saving gadgets and he cited the toaster as a prime
example. Without the patent system, Dickinson argued, we would likely
still be burning our bread over an open flame. 5
Dickinson was on solid ground invoking the toaster. The useful kitch-
en gadget is a good example of the success of the U.S. patent system. The
toaster story (stripped to admittedly allegorical essentials) goes something
like this: back around the turn of the last century, someone thought of using
electric coils to toast a slice of bread and took the trouble to design and
build a machine to do the job. In exchange for making the design for this
machine publicly known, the U.S government awarded a time-limited mo-
nopoly over the use and implementation of this particular, pathbreaking
design. The patent helped compensate the inventor for the costs incurred in
bringing the design to the marketplace where it benefited breakfast lovers
everywhere.
But wait, there is more. Seeing the popularity of the newfangled elec-
tric toaster, competitors were quickly inspired to improve upon it. One
inventor had the bright idea for a radically different design with spring-
loaded slots for the bread slices. This new and improved "pop-up" toaster
also received patent protection and came to the market. The public, seeing
its advantages, overwhelmingly traded in their old toasters for new ones.
Progress was fostered. The economy benefited. And, as hard as it may be to
believe, the U.S. Patent office continues, even today, to issue patents on
new toaster designs. A good, fairly recent example is U.S. Patent
5,943,948, issued in 1999. This patent covers the design of a machine that
allows the user to toast a selection of images-including one of Mickey
Mouse-onto their bread. 6
Leaving aside for the moment the question of the extent to which this
latest innovation truly represents progress, the central point is this: by
granting patents over specific toaster designs, U.S. Patent Office officials
3. See SETH SHULMAN, OWNING THE FUTURE (1999).
4. Science Friday: Patents and Intellectual Property (NPR Broadcast March 5, 1999) (transcript
on file with Chicago-Kent Law Review).
5. Id.
6. See U.S. Patent No. 5,943, 948, (filed Jan. 29, 1998). For those who can't live without, the
resulting product, now available, is known as the Villaware Disney Mickey Mouse Toaster.
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like Dickinson can reasonably claim that they have helped promote im-
provements in toaster technology. In so doing, the patent system has argua-
bly added "the fuel of interest to the fire of genius" just as Abraham
Lincoln famously hoped it would.7
Bruce Lehman, Dickinson's predecessor as U.S. patent commissioner,
made an argument strikingly similar to Dickinson's using an even more
classic example. As Lehman explained in a 1995 interview "[w]hen I walk
into my office every morning, I see the patent model of Thomas Edison's
light bulb sitting there... 8 The display, Lehman said, never failed to re-
mind him that "intellectual property protection, patents and copyrights have
been a major part of the economic growth of America from the very begin-
ning."9
III.
It is probably no coincidence that Dickinson's toaster and Lehman's
lightbulb both emerged near the end of the 19th century. It was then, after
the U.S. Civil War, that the U.S. Patent system really came into its own.
The historian Thomas P. Hughes has noted, for example, that the number of
patents issued between 1866 and 1896 grew exponentially, doubling each
year during this period.' 0 This was, of course, the Gilded Age, a time of
dramatic technological change that altered our thinking about innovation in
ways that are still relevant more than a century later. Consider, for instance,
the extraordinary fact that Thomas Edison, patron saint of this era, still
holds the record for the most patents (1,093) ever issued to a single indi-
vidual. 11 Edison invented many things, from motion pictures to the use of
poured concrete in construction, but he is best remembered for the incan-
descent light bulb, an archetypal product that has come, for us today, to
symbolize invention itself. 12
7. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions, Jacksonville, Illinois, in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865 at 3, 11 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
8. Seth Shulman, Patent Medicine, TECH. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 28, 30.
9. Id.
10. THOMAS P. HUGHES, AMERICAN GENESIS: A CENTURY OF INVENTION AND TECHNOLOGICAL
ENTHUSIASM, 1870-1970, at 14 (1989).
11. Between 1869 and 1933 the U.S. Patent Office issued 1,093 patents to Thomas Edison and the
record for patents issued to a single individual holds to this day. For a complete listing of Edison's
patents, see The Edison Papers, Edison's Patents, http://edison.rutgers.edu/patents.htm (last visited May
1,2009).
12. Lest there be any doubt about the pervasiveness of this symbol, interested readers may wish to
pay an online visit to the homepage of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and watch their browser's
logo icon in the upper left-hand comer of the screen turn instantly into a light bulb. United States Patent
and Trademark Office, http://uspto.gov (last visited May 1, 2009).
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It is worth dwelling for a moment on the pervasive image of a light
bulb over someone's head to connote that he or she has just had a (poten-
tially patentable) brainstorm. The favored status of the light bulb as a sym-
bol for ideas and innovation is, I believe, linked to our profound conceptual
problem in apportioning rights to intellectual property today. This is true
because our economy has passed through what some have termed the
"second wave" of the industrial age and into the "third wave" of a so-called
"knowledge-based" economy. 13 Put simply, we have come to a time when
ideas, concepts, and codes-software codes and genetic codes-have be-
come some of the most valuable things one can own in our society.
Examples abound. Today's software firms such as Adobe and Micro-
soft, have won patents on so-called software subroutines-the basic build-
ing blocks of computer code needed to write new programs-and used their
ownership to stymie would-be competitors. Such software firms have thus
made literally millions of dollars not by bringing products to market but
rather by leveraging ownership rights over parts of the languages our com-
puters speak.
The same is true in the biomedical field. Pharmaceutical firms in pur-
suit of blockbuster, billion-dollar drugs have increasingly laid proprietary
claim not just to new drug formulations but to the genes from wild plants,
insects, and microorganisms from the globe's far reaches as well as to hu-
man genes linked to particular diseases. There is little doubt that some of
this now-patented genetic information will ultimately prove valuable in the
creation of new drugs and treatments. But let's be clear: such patents grant
rights to "potentially useful knowledge" rather than to know-how embodied
in a particular product's design.
It also bears noting that such "potentially useful knowledge" has be-
come big business itself. The corporate giant IBM, for instance, now earns
nearly $1 billion each year by granting licenses to the "potentially useful
knowledge" in its patent portfolio. For some time now, companies such as
Texas Instruments, have even brought in as much cash by licensing their
often-conceptual patents as they have by actually selling products. 14
Today, new ideas are still frequently embodied in the designs of mar-
ketable products like toasters and light bulbs. But the U.S. patent system,
successfully designed to protect rights to such specific, tangible gadgets
has, in our knowledge-based society, been increasingly forced to contend
with claims that it is ill-suited for: claims over ideas and codes-in other
words multifaceted, conceptual tools. In its efforts to apportion proprietary
13. See ALvIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE (1980) (discussing these terms throughout).
14. See Norm Alster, New Profits from Patents, FORTUNE, Apr. 25, 1988, at 185, 186.
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rights to these kinds of claims, the U.S. patent system has failed calami-
tously.
We have arrived, in other words, at a point where disembodied and
multifaceted conceptual tools are enormously powerful and potentially
lucrative. And, while these tools are not products in any traditional sense of
the word, that light bulb still hovers over the heads of our idealized inven-
tors: we still think of ideas primarily as products. Even more problematic
than our own conceptual limitations, however, are those of the officials in
charge. The world has changed. But the examiners at the U.S. patent office
remain caught within the confines of the toaster model of invention.
W.
In the long sweep of history, the patent system's current problems are
relatively recent. Consider for instance that, as recently as the 1870s, the
U.S. Patent Office required applicants to submit a prototype-an actual
working model-of any invention they sought to patent. In 1876, the U.S.
Senate considered a bill calling upon the U.S. Patent Office to do away
with this requirement. 15 At the time, the problem presented was a logistical
one: supporters of the bill, sponsored by Connecticut Senator James E.
English, testified that the Patent Office's attic coffers were literally over-
flowing. 16 There was no space to put the roughly 20,000 new models the
agency expected to receive annually in the ensuing years. 17 So Congress, in
a belt-tightening exercise, ultimately decided to abolish the rule requiring
prospective patent applicants to submit tangible prototypes of their inven-
tions.
The mostly forgotten story of the patent's office's abandonment of the
model requirement merits our attention today because it illustrates just how
far away we have moved from this prior formulation. What kind of work-
ing model would the biotechnology firm Myriad Genetics have built en
route to garnering U.S. Patent 5,837,492, which covers the naturally occur-
ring, so-called human breast cancer gene known as BRCA2? 18 What kind
of model would Amazon.com have submitted to win U.S. Patent 5,960,411
on its so-called "One-Click Technology"' 19 that gives the company exclu-
15. See SETH SHULMAN, THE TELEPHONE GAMBIT: CHASING ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL'S
SECRET 30-31 (2008) (discussing United States Patent Laws: Main Points of the Senate Bill Amending
the Present Laws-A Practical Engineer's Argument, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1876, at 1).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492 (filed Apr. 29, 1996).
19. See U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sept. 12, 1997).
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sive dominion over the notion of allowing an online shopper to purchase a
product with a single click of a computer mouse? These firms couldn't
possibly have made such tangible prototypes because the patents cited
above cover nothing more than potentially useful knowledge, or what some
patent watchers now resourcefully prefer to call "actionable knowledge. '' 20
To best understand the distinction between patents on products and
patents on actionable knowledge, let's invoke one more archetypal gadget.
In addition to the toaster and the lightbulb, let's briefly consider the mouse-
trap. After all, as the expression goes, people are always seeking to design
a better one; historically at least, our patent system was supposed to aid
precisely this quest by offering a powerful incentive to inventors. Today's
problem, however, was forcefully brought home to me a number of years
ago by a software programmer named Wallace Judd, then president of the
California-based Mentrix Corporation. As Judd put it, rather than encourag-
ing people to design a better mousetrap, the current patent system is too
often granting a monopoly on the idea of trapping mice.21
The more one thinks about Judd's distinction, the clearer and more
profound it becomes. To the extent that the patent office can protect the
design for a particular new mousetrap, it can theoretically foster innova-
tion. The precise opposite outcome results, however, the moment the patent
system begins to grant an exclusive, proprietary right over the mousetrap
concept. In this latter case, the patent system awards to one party a twenty-
year monopoly on a whole field of technological endeavor. In so doing, the
system effectively blocks new innovators-the very ones it was intended to
encourage.
Before looking more closely at the variables involved, suffice it to say
for the moment that evidence of the patent-led stifling of innovation is
mounting in a number of high-tech areas. Some economists have even gone
so far as to heretically suggest that, taken as a whole, we might be better off
economically and technologically without any patent system at all. 22 There
are many examples of dysfunctional patenting, including a growing number
of examples in the realm of human gene and tissue patents. But, instead,
let's briefly consider the story of what happened not long ago in the strange
20. See, SHULMAN, supra note 3, at 6.
21. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Public Hearing on Use of the Patent System to Protect
Software-Related Inventions: Before Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commis-
sioner of Patents and Trademarks, Jan. 26-27, 1994, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
com/hearings/software/sanjose/sj-judd.html. (statement of Wallace Judd, Mentrix Corporation). See
also SHULMAN, supra note 3, at 7.
22. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 27 (2008); see also Michael Fitzgerald, A Patent is Wonh
Having, Right? Well, Maybe Not, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 15, 2007, §3, at 3 (discussing this argument).
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case of patents on medical procedures.
Over the long history of the U.S. Patent system, concerns about public
health tended to limit which health care-related inventions might be
deemed patentable. But, in the early 1990s, doctors flocked to the patent
office to take advantage of a seemingly new class of patents-those on
medical procedures. Patents had, of course, been granted for some time on
novel medical devices, but some case law and general laxity on the part of
patent examiners seemed to have opened the door fully to a new type of
patent. The change was subtle at first. No one could point to an overt deci-
sion by the U.S. Patent Office to allow patents on medical procedures; ra-
ther, it seems that, starting as early as the mid-1950s, the U.S. Patent
Office's distinctions between medical treatments, devices, and procedures
began to erode. 23 By the mid-1990s, however, according to one tally, the
U.S. Patent Office was issuing more than 100 medical-procedure patents
each month. 24
One well-publicized lawsuit brought a good deal of public attention to
the situation. In 1993, Jack Singer, an eye surgeon at the Lahey Hitchcock
Medical Center and professor at Dartmouth Medical School, was sued by a
colleague for performing and teaching a type of cataract surgery that al-
lowed the eye to heal without stitches. 25 Singer's colleague, an Arizona-
based eye surgeon named Samuel Pallin, had won a patent on the "stitch-
less" cataract procedure and was demanding that Singer purchase a license
and pay a royalty to perform it. Pallin even demanded that, absent such a
license, Singer, in his capacity as a medical school professor, could no
longer teach the technique to a new generation of doctors as he had been
doing for several years.
Outraged, Singer decided to fight back. Pallin v. Singer became some-
thing of a lightning rod for opinions on the topic from many quarters. Sing-
er's legal challenge to Pallin's patent was even joined by the clout and
resources of the American Medical Association (AMA). 26 After all, the
doctor's lobby group recognized that the prospect of physicians suing one
another over rights to health-giving procedures posed a threat to the profes-
sion, (and also no doubt worried about the bad publicity such lawsuits
would engender). In his public remarks on the issue, then-AMA president
23. See Robert L. Lowes, Are You Stealing from Other Doctors?, MED. ECON., Mar. 11, 1996, at
195, 196.
24. Id.
25. Pallin v. Singer, Civ. No. 5:93-202, 1995 WL 608365 (D. Vt. May 1, 1995).
26. See SHULMAN, supra note 3, at 35-36. The AMA's stance on the issue was also endorsed by
some 16 separate organizations of medical professionals. Id. at 34. See also AMA Council on Ethical &
Jud. Aff., Ethical Issues in the Patenting of Medical Procedures, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 341 (1998).
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Robert McAfee stressed the longstanding humanitarian traditions of the
medical profession. As he put it, the "history, excellence, and tradition of
medicine has been that whenever a new procedure occurs and is proven
effective, it is imperative to share that knowledge with the world at the
earliest moment." 27
Nonetheless, as Pallin v. Singer worked its way through the courts, the
problem seemed to be mounting. Around this time, the journal Medical
Economics pointed out in a cover story that, "Proliferating medical-
procedure patents [had begun to] entangle not only surgeons, but a wide
range of practitioners. '28 Even worse, according to the journal's assess-
ment, many of the newly issued patents on medical procedures covered
basic skills doctors were expected to learn during their medical residen-
cies. 29
There is no shortage of outrageous examples of medical-procedure pa-
tents. Perhaps most notable, among many remarkable candidates, is a pa-
tent issued to a radiologist named John D. Stephens conferring upon him
proprietary rights over the medical procedure of using ultrasound to deter-
mine the gender of a fetus-a procedure that amounts to nothing more than
looking at an ultrasound image of a fetus to see whether it has a penis or
not. 30
Notably, though, the prospect of a growing number of lawsuits be-
tween medical practitioners was so unpopular in the United States that, in
1996, Congress decided to step in. It was widely pointed out around this
time that almost all industrialized nations of the world had already specifi-
cally outlawed patents on medical procedures because of the threat such
patents posed to public health. Despite such a threat, though, U.S. legisla-
tors were loathe to exempt an entire category of subject matter from paten-
tability. In the United States, Congress has never specifically exempted any
subject matter from consideration at the patent office and has placed re-
strictions only upon inventions-such as those relating to nuclear wea-
pons-that pose a clear potential threat to national security. 31 As a result,
in an odd compromise, Congress passed and the President signed into law a
measure that continues to allow medical-procedure patents to be granted
but takes the teeth out of them by prohibiting medical practitioners from
27. Sally Squires, AMA Condemns Patents for Medical Procedures, WASH. POST, Jun. 20, 1995,
at A01.
28. Lowes, supra note 23, at 195.
29. Id. at 196.
30. U.S. Patent No. 4,986,274 (filed Dec. 4, 1989).
31. See Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, 35 USC §§ 181-88 (2006); Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
42 USC §§ 2011-23 (2006).
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suing one another. 32
By almost all accounts, the 1996 congressional compromise has not
been particularly effective. Medical-procedure patenting continues apace
(with roughly 100 new patents on medical procedures still being issued
monthly) 33 and, while so-called medical practitioners are not allowed to
sue one another, enterprising lawyers have recognized that medical device
makers and even research institutions can still be sued for "inducing in-
fringement" of a medical procedure by a doctor.34 A recent report on the
growing number of such lawsuits quotes Aaron Kesselheim, a patent attor-
ney and doctor who conducts health policy research at Brigham and Wom-
en's Hospital in Boston. As Kesselheim cautiously puts it, "It's not clear
that providing a monopoly over a certain process promotes innovation in
the field of patient care delivery." 35 Rather, he says, doctors may refrain
from a procedure out of concern that someone will sue them. "[I]f that af-
fects the care that they are trying to provide to the patients, then that's a
negative," Kesselheim says. 36
V.
Among the questions we might ask about medical procedure patents is
this one: How did the situation ever occur? How did we get so far away
from the original goals and conception of the patent system that the U.S.
Patent Office would consider awarding a patent on reading an ultrasound
image or, in another stupefying example, on a method for treating a bleed-
ing nose? 37 The answer is important and relevant not only to medical pro-
cedures but also patents on genes, software, and business methods of all
kinds. In each case, it is important to recognize that the current "anything
32. On September 30, 1996, President Clinton signed Public Law No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-
546. The Act denies patent owners the right to enforce patents covering medical or surgical procedures
that do not involve patented drugs or devices. Patents on medical and surgical procedures performed on
a human body, organ cadaver, or even on an animal used in medical research or instruction relating to
the treatment of humans, are now unenforceable. Id. As discussed infra note 34, the law is not without
significant loopholes, however.
33. Tresa Baldas, As Medical Patents Surge, So Do Lawsuits, NAT'L L.J., July 16, 2007, at 4.
34. Id. Baldas cites, for instance, a $1.35 billion settlement in such a case, namely Medtronic
Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, No. 01-2373 MLV, 03-2055 MLV, 2004 WL 2905403 (W.D. Tenn.
May 20, 2004). It is also worth noting, as my legal colleagues have informed me, the current, congres-
sionally-mandated exemption only covers licensed healthcare workers performing a narrowly-defined
"medical activity," so researchers with doctoral degrees are not necessarily protected. In addition, the
law is not retroactive, so patents issued before 1996 (including some of the examples listed) are still
enforceable through lawsuits.
35. Baldas, supra note 33, at 4.
36. Id.
37. U.S. Patent No. 5,546,964, at [57] (filed Jan. 27, 1995).
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goes" climate did not occur as a result of a conscious policy decision. In-
stead, in each case, the calamitous outcome was incremental, a kind of
death by a thousand cuts. Patent policy, like many areas of the law, works
by the accretion of precedent. But in the patent field, unlike other areas of
the law, the pressures push almost entirely from one direction. Applications
continually arrive at the U.S. Patent Office with claims as broad as savvy
patent lawyers can think to write them. Court verdicts in patent disputes,
often intending to resolve specific, circumscribed problems wind up open-
ing the door ever wider to whole new categories of ownership rights. I will
leave it for legal scholars to plumb these matters more fully, but let's take a
moment to review just a few key milestones here.
Consider first, the story of patents on life forms. Several decades ago,
no such patents were issued. But a key legal milestone was passed in 1980
in the landmark case Diamond v. Chakrabarty.38 In this case, the U.S. Su-
preme Court ruled, in a split, five-to-four decision, that a live, genetically
altered microorganism could be patented. 39 This ruling held that the issue
of whether an invention is animate or inanimate should have no bearing on
its patentability as long as the invention could be seen to meet the criteria
of being a novel, useful product of human manufacture and not obvious to
someone skilled in the particular field in which the patent is filed.40 Ananda
M. Chakrabarty, a microbiologist then at the General Electric Company,
had used genetic engineering techniques to create an altered bacterium that
had presumably never before existed in nature.41 Because Chakrabarty's
bacterium showed promise in breaking down crude oil, its lucrative poten-
tial for cleaning up oil spills arguably made his invention useful. 42 While
specific plant varieties had long been protected through a more limited
category of patent, Chakrabarty's successful claim for a so-called utility
patent, indicated that a bacterium could be treated much like any useful
machine or invention. 43 And so the door opened to a profusion of patents
on living things of all kinds from human tissues to entire, genetically dis-
tinct strains of mice. Many of these subsequent patents involved significant
expansions of their own; but Chakrabarty crossed the crucial threshold by
first allowing a patent on a life form.
A strikingly similar thing happened with computer software. Back in
38. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
39. Id. at 309.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 305.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 309. Diamond was Sidney A. Diamond, then commissioner of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, whose patent examiners had initially rejected Chakrabarty's patent application.
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the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court had specifically held that software fell
into the category of "mental processes," whose logical steps needed to be
preserved in the public domain as "basic tools of scientific and technologi-
cal work." 44 But then, in 1981, Diamond v. Diehr45 came along. In the
case, the patent holder, James Diehr, had sought a patent on a mechanical
system for manufacturing rubber that included a software program to con-
trol the temperature throughout the process. 46 Once again, the Supreme
Court ruled by a narrow margin that the inclusion of a software program in
a patent application on a mechanical system ought not automatically disqu-
alify it from consideration. 47 Diamond v. Diehr thus pushed the door to
software patents slightly ajar. But the Patent Office's liberal interpretation
of the ruling soon flung it open far wider. Before long, the patent office
was awash in a flood of applications for stand-alone patents on software
programs from the trivially small to the enormously complex.
More recently, a similar story occurred on the vexing topic of patents
on so-called business methods, a category that includes everything from
storing financial information to the medical procedures discussed above.
Business methods, like living bacteria, and computer software, were once
considered ineligible for patents. The line on what constituted a "business
method" was sometimes hard to draw but, in general, when the subject
reached the courts, such method patents were held to be invalid. But then,
in 1998, a case involving two banks reached the Federal Circuit. The case
was State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., and
here again, the ruling opened the door to a whole new area: the prospect of
patenting methods of doing business. 48. In this case, the appeals court al-
lowed Signature Financial Group to enforce its patent on a method widely
used within the banking industry to electronically keep track of a client's
multiple mutual funds on a single statement. 49 If anyone had stepped back
to think about it, the so-called "hub and spoke" method of accounting for
mutual funds would have seemed an awfully far cry from a light bulb or a
mousetrap. But somehow, the "toaster model" of invention-however in-
applicable and ill-suited-had won the day again. A conceptual, multifa-
ceted tool-rather than a particular, innovative new product designed for
the marketplace-was granted an exclusive, time-limited monopoly by the
44. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
45. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
46. Id. at 187.
47. Id. at 192-94.
48. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
49. Id. at 1373.
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U.S. Patent Office. 50
These three legal rulings are just a few well-known examples of a
whole cascade of decisions, in the courts and at the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office itself, that have incrementally but dramatically broadened and
changed the notion of what a patent is. In each case the professionals in-
volved have found it difficult to say "no" to a particular, new and incre-
mentally broader claim. Often, peculiar aspects of these cases have
obscured the larger issues at stake. But, in each case, the result has been to
lead us ever closer to (forgive the awful-but-irresistible pun) a patently
untenable situation.
VI.
Before moving on, it is worth some further discussion of the relation
of patent rights to the marketplace because there is little question that con-
fusion at the Patent Office is greatly compounded by the rhetoric of free
enterprise. Proponents of the U.S. patent system like to assert that patents
encourage technological development but this belief is too often conflated
with a caricatured notion of an entrepreneurial free market. A good exam-
ple can be seen in the National Inventors Expo, an event held regularly in
Washington, D.C. and co-sponsored by the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office. The expo is a fascinating event with an atmosphere that falls some-
where between that of a high school science fair and a late night on the
Home Shopping Network. Scores of independent inventors bring and hawk
their inventions-everything from patented bookmarks, to bolts that change
color when adequately tightened. The Inventors Expo-and many other
events like it-resonate with a deep-seated tenet of American mythology:
that entrepreneurial inventors built-and continue to drive-the country's
free-market economy. But while we are frequently encouraged to think of
patents as part of a dynamic free-market "knowledge bazaar," it is impor-
tant to recognize that patents have, with their inviolable right to exclude
others, always represented the perfect antithesis of the free market.
The evidence that patents represent a purposeful override of the free
market is clear going back to the year 1421 when the first-known patent
was granted to Fillippo Brunelleschi, the Florentine architect, engineer and
inventor. 5 1 Brunelleschi had invented a barge with a hoist on it to carry
marble from Italian quarries upstream along the Amo River to Florence. As
50. Id.
51. Steven Saas, Brunelleschi's Bargain: Intellectual Property in Digital Space, FED. RES. BANK
OF BOSTON REGIONAL REv., Fall 1993, at 6, 6.
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far as we know, his barge never worked very well. But, notably, Brunelle-
schi made a deal with the Florentine city-state to enforce his exclusive right
to the barge technology for three years. There is no evidence of a discus-
sion of promoting technology or the free market. On the contrary, this first
patent seems to have been an utterly collusive deal. The state wanted Bru-
nelleschi's technology and these were presumably the only terms under
which he was willing to make it available-terms that were, of course,
highly favorable to Brunelleschi in shutting down and preempting his com-
petitors. The state has shown a keen interest in the power of granting the
patent system's temporary monopolies ever since. As MIT economist Les-
ter Thurow has noted, for instance, this is at least part of the reason that the
patent system was written into the very first article of the U.S. Constitution.
The founders sought to systematically disregard British patents. The aim
was to allow U.S. patent protection on indigenous technological develop-
ment (regardless of whether it had previously been patented in Britain) as a
means to spur the domestic economy of the new nation. 52
So, while patents necessarily limit rather than encourage free markets,
they still can arguably spur innovation when used correctly. Some contem-
porary thinking on this topic has centered on the important rubric of how
far "upstream" a conferred patent right stands from the marketplace. In this
regard, one can think of ideas on a spectrum from basic research to actual
products as further upstream or downstream respectively. The concept can
be very useful. In their seminal paper on the topic, legal scholars Michael
Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg explain that, "Policy-makers should seek to
ensure coherent boundaries of upstream patents and to minimize restrictive
licensing practices that interfere with downstream product development.
Otherwise, more upstream rights may lead paradoxically to fewer useful
products for improving human health. '53
Put another way, a patent on an "upstream" technology will turn into a
kind of "tollbooth" along the road of technological innovation. As the
Economist has cleverly put it, patents too far upstream become little more
than a means to "charging rents on dreams."'54 Unfortunately, however,
under the sway of the "toaster model" of invention, the U.S. Patent Office
has erected a host of upstream tollbooths. And, perhaps worst of all, is how
powerful such patents can potentially be. Continuing with the tollbooth
analogy, patent holders today are not only being permitted to erect all man-
52. See, Lester C. Thurow, Patents and Pirates, BOSTON GLOBE, June 18, 1996, at 42.
53. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 701 (1998) (emphasis added).
54. The Harm of Patents, ECONOMIST, Aug. 22, 1992, at. 17.
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ner of tollbooths along the road to the marketplace, these tollbooths (in the
form of patent licensing arrangements) can charge any fee, or even block
technological travelers altogether. In the U.S. patent system, after all, there
is no requirement that patent holders license their technology at all, turning
tollbooths into potentially outright roadblocks.
Recently, there is some evidence that, at least in some high-tech areas
researchers may be increasingly ignoring the tollbooths and zooming ahead
anyway. Timothy Caulfield, for instance, has recently suggested that em-
pirical data in the area of gene patenting indicates that upstream patents
have not proven discernibly deleterious to innovation in the field. 55 The
fact is that such effects are notoriously hard to measure. It seems most like-
ly that what is showing up in such data is the reality, especially in the bio-
medical field, that so many conflicting patents have been issued that
researchers are choosing to simply ignore them and plow ahead with their
research nonetheless. If this is in fact the case, the patents that now appear
toothless may still prove highly problematic; researchers ignore them at
their peril. History teaches that such proprietary rights can bite even long
after the fact of developments in a given field.56
VII.
While researchers like Caulfield rightly question the extent to which
upstream patents are actually interfering with innovation, it bears noting
that even Caulfield's findings acknowledge evidence of a number of related
scourges, including: increased secrecy among researchers; skewed research
direction; and erosion of public trust in the research endeavor. 57 Like Caul-
field, a number of scientists at the nation's top university and research insti-
tutes have noted that collegial discourse has withered in the face of
proprietary claims and secrecy among researchers. 58 Such findings allude
to an all-too-frequently neglected piece of the overall picture: the extent to
which proprietary rights such as patents can erode norms and pathways for
sharing information among would-be innovators. This issue surfaced clear-
ly, for instance, in the brief review above of the problems caused by medi-
cal-procedure patents. The medical profession recognized that doctors
couldn't do their jobs effectively if proprietary claims interfered with doc-
55. Timothy Caulfield, Human Gene Patents: Proof of Problems?, 84 CMI-KENT L. REv. 133
(2009).
56. One of many good examples can be seen in George Selden's U.S. Patent No. 549,160, for a
"Road Engine," which surfaced in an eight-year legal battle against the Ford Motor Company in 1903.
57. Caulfield, supra note 55, at 104.
58. See, Eric G. Campbell, et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Evidence From a
National Survey, 287 JAMA 473, 478 (2002).
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tors' ability to freely share information about new techniques with col-
leagues and medical students.
We can think of such shared pools of information and know-how as a
kind of intellectual-property infrastructure, or what I like to call an "info-
structure." In this conception, the "infostructure" can be seen as those se-
minal ideas, standards, languages, and tools that, much like an
infrastructure, provide an underlying base or foundation for a given field of
endeavor, organization, or system.
One can think of the growing body of knowledge and the system
through which it is shared as a kind of platform or framework (not unlike
the network of roads that makes up the infrastructure of a city). In this
sense, some type of knowledge constitutes a shared "infostructure" that
properly belongs to all who use it. It exists in a gray area between the mar-
ketplace and the public square, between the boardroom and the classroom.
As we build a global economy for the 215t century, we need a new way to
think about and value this conceptual information commons. 59
As many are coming to realize, things work best in the knowledge-
based economy when certain seminal information assets-particularly
those needed by all players in a given high-tech sector to compete-are
pooled and shared. In the biomedical field, shared use of genetic sequence
information from the human genome is a good example, as is the know-
how that allows different engineers to design distinct machines that can all
plug into a single type of wall socket or software that, because of common
protocols, can travel seamlessly over the Internet. Thus the task before us,
in high-tech sectors from software design to genomics, is to proactively
identify the infostructure: to define when shared interests should override
private claims on the knowledge frontier.
Perhaps the first step is to cultivate a more enlightened, long-term
view of the research endeavor. Universities and corporations alike must
understand that the fruits of the proverbial research garden cannot be
picked indefinitely without tending to the trees and broader ecosystem from
which they derive. Much to his credit, Norbert Wiener, mathematician and
father of cybernetic theory, expressed this clearly back in 1954. As Wiener
put it in his classic work, Invention: The Care and Feeding of Ideas:
[T]he value of a piece of scientific work only appears to the full with its
further application by many minds and with its free communication to
other minds. Here any secrecy or any rights of property possession will
naturally have the effect of making people shy off from a preempted
59. For examples and analysis of the so-called "information commons," see, for example, the
work of David Bollier, available at http://www.onthecommons.org.
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field of work. 60
Of course, the roots of Wiener's thinking can be seen to extend considera-
bly further back to the ideals of the enlightenment. To enlist as many minds
as possible to the problems of his day, John Adams, the second U.S. Presi-
dent, recognized in 1765 that "[t]he preservation of the means of know-
ledge among the lowest ranks is of more importance to the public than all
the property of all the rich men in the country." 61
A helpful example, here, can be seen in the story of the so-called Ro-
setta stone. Discovered in 1799, this stone, now residing at the British Mu-
seum, bears the same passage of text written in Egyptian hieroglyphics,
more modem Egyptian writing and in Classical Greek. 62 The stone proved
indispensable in helping to decipher ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics. But
imagine how difficult that task would have been if pieces of the Rosetta
stone's information had been separately and independently owned.
The analogy idea here is that rather than parceling out individual own-
ership rights over human genes, we should not underestimate the value that
can come from having unfettered access to the genome in its entirety. That
will be the best way to decipher its mystery. Like the Rosetta stone, scien-
tists will return to it again and again for many decades to come.
VIII.
Today's privatization of knowledge assets-including genes and ge-
netic information-threatens to choke productivity, magnify inequities, and
erode our democratic institutions. And the problem seems to be getting
worse, not better. How did we get here? At least in part, by misguidedly
treating ideas exclusively as commodities. And by employing a patent sys-
tem-designed to protect gadgets like toasters-to apportion rights to bits
of useful knowledge increasingly "upstream" from the marketplace. To
insure productivity, equity, and democracy in the realm of intellectual
property, we need start by adopting some of the time-honored legal tools
we use to control the excesses of private ownership in other realms.
This means injecting more commonsense into the patent system. We
need to demand that our legislators ask questions about productivity: name-
ly, "Is the system working as intended to spur innovation?" Is it finding the
right balance between rewarding the thinkers and the doers? Are patent
60. NORBERT WEINER, INVENTION: THE CARE AND FEEDING OF IDEAS 153 (1993).
61. John Adams, Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law (1765), reprinted in 3 THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 447, 457 (Charles F. Adams ed.,
Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851).
62. See E.A. WALLIS BUDGE, THE ROSETTA STONE (Dover Publications 1989) (1929).
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rights being defined specifically enough to both protect patent owners and
spur new innovation? We also need to ask questions about the system's
equity: Is it as fair as it could be? For instance, a strong case can be made
that we have unintentionally created a winner-take-all system in which
incremental inventions are rewarded disproportionately, allowing a handful
of individuals to disproportionately capture and leverage the $137 billion
annual taxpayer investment into federal R&D made by U.S. taxpayers. 63
Finally, we need to question the extent to which the U.S. patent system
reflects our democratic values in the extent to which it preserves access to
shared intellectual resources.
Drawing sensible lines around intellectual property rights is not as
hard as it may sound. We need a nuanced system, and the first place to look
is the well-established legal framework governing tangible property owner-
ship. As I have argued elsewhere, for instance, even a nation that reveres
private land ownership can decide that some pieces of land are so spectacu-
lar or vital in some respect that they should be designated for shared use as
part of a public trust. Along these lines, I have for several years now called
for consideration of establishing the equivalent of National Parks for know-
ledge: Intellectual-Property-Free (or IP-Free) zones.64 I have also sug-
gested that the human genome is a prime candidate for the first such a
designation. To at least some extent, with many researchers placing genetic
sequence information online and in the public domain, this is already hap-
pening to some extent in a defacto fashion. Still, I believe the designation
of an IP-Free zone still merits our consideration for the important and use-
ful precedent it could set.
Another helpful conceptual tool that can be adapted from the realm of
land ownership is the simple and practical notion of zoning. Zoning ordin-
ances insure that, while an individual can buy land in a nice residential
neighborhood, for instance, it doesn't mean that individual has the right to
build a refinery there. In other words, one's ownership right is restricted
depending on its context. Importantly, though, there is no similar concept
today in the realm of intellectual property. The analogy here is clear as
well. In some contexts, private patent claims should be similarly restricted.
In certain contexts, for instance, perhaps patent holders should be required
to license their technology, or should be unable to enforce their patents in
certain upstream, nonprofit, research situations. The 1996 federal legisla-
63. AAAS, 2007 BUDGET PROPOSES GAINS IN DEFENSE, SPACE AND SOME PHYSICAL SCIENCES
R&D, CUTS IN OTHER PROGRAMS: AAAS ANALYSIS OF R&D IN THE FY 2007 BUDGET (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/prev07p.pdf
64. See Seth Shulman, We Need New Ways to Own and Share Knowledge, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
(Wash., D.C.), Feb. 19, 1999, at A64.
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tion limiting the enforceability of medical procedure patents discussed
above is an important (if imperfect) example.
As we address such broader social concerns about the effects of pa-
tenting, we need to bear in mind the comparatively narrowly construed
roots of the U.S. Patent System, including its former model requirement.
We need to remember that patents were always intended to reflect a bal-
ance between titleholders and the public, and are only fulfilling their stated
purpose to the extent that they are, in fact, demonstrably promoting innova-
tion. Finally, we would do well to remember the value of freely shared
information, including the extent to which the "infostructure" operates
much like a garden from which future intellectual property fruit can blos-
som and grow. As historian Gar Alperovitz has noted, "Seemingly contem-
porary transformations inevitably build on knowledge accumulated over
generations." As he aptly puts it, "What we accomplish stands atop a Gi-
braltar of technological inheritance. ' 65
65. Gar Alperovitz, Distributing Our Technological Inheritance, TECH. REV., Oct. 1994, at 30,
31-32.
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